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AN INITIAL, BUT POSITIVE, STEP
IN THE REALM OF CYBERSECURITY
Saxby Chambliss*
ABSTRACT
On December 18, 2015, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Omnibus) into law. Title I of Division N of the Omnibus
contains the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA). This
Article presents insights on the interpretation, intended operation, and significance of CISA from the perspective of a key architect of this important
piece of national security legislation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Understanding the Cyber Threat
Cyber attacks are not a new phenomenon. For years, government and
private sector experts have warned of growing threats, the massive theft
of intellectual property to cyber espionage, and billions of dollars being lost
by the U.S. economy. The former head of the National Security Agency
(NSA) called cyber espionage the “greatest transfer of wealth in history.”1
With the annual cost of cybercrime and cyber espionage to the world
economy estimated at more than $375 billion,2 the “rise of the sophisticated
cyber criminal is the fastest growing security threat to organizations and
individuals.”3
Cyber attacks are now commonplace enough that, in 2014, James
Comey, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), testified
before Congress that “[t]here’re two kinds of big companies in the United
States: those who have been hacked by the Chinese and those who don’t yet
*Saxby Chambliss is Partner at DLA Piper; former U.S. Senator (2003-2015); and former
United States Representative (1995-2003).
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know they’ve been hacked by the Chinese.”4 Consider the high-profile
attacks in recent years against restaurants, banks, health insurance companies,
social media, retailers, and the Internal Revenue Service and the Office of
Personnel Management. Each attack reminds us that cyber incidents can
happen against anyone, anywhere, at any time.
Today, law enforcement learns of a large-scale data breach “close to
every two to three days”—a notable change from the two to three weeks of
years past.5 There is no single answer for this sharp increase. Certainly, the
same technological advances that facilitate communication, enhance
productivity, and improve our quality of life have created more opportunities for malicious actors and inadvertent cybersecurity compromises.
Even as many organizations look to fortify their computer networks and
information systems, not all are prepared.6 Organizations-including the
government-naturally weigh potential risks against the costs and
benefits of enhanced security. Some are “soft targets,” providing smart
and tech-savvy malicious actors with multiple avenues for exploitation.
Adding to the complexity, some victims may be reluctant to publicize
incidents;7 this, in turn, can create a false sense of security for consumers,
employees, or others. Then there are the threat actors themselves-nation
states, organized crime, individual hackers-actively exploiting vulnerabilities
for malicious purposes.
Compounding all of this is the fact that data is everywhere. Financial,
healthcare, corporate, and government information are now favorite targets
of malicious actors.8 Moreover, ransomware, data manipulation, and even
hacks of the personal emails of high-ranking government officials are on the
4

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Hearing on FBI Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of James B. Comey, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation).
5
Elise Viebeck, FBI: Data Breaches ‘Increasing Substantially,’ THE HILL (May 14, 2015,
03:01 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/242110-fbi-official-data-breaches-increa
sing-substantially (quoting remarks by James Trainor).
6
See PONEMON INST., THE CYBER RESILIENT ORGANIZATION: LEARNING TO THRIVE
AGAINST THREATS 2 (Sept. 2015), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/427640/RS_Content/
Reports/The_Cyber_Resilient_Enterprise_Ponemon_Report.pdf (noting that over 60% of
respondents say that their organization either does not have a cybersecurity incident response
plan or has only an “ad hoc” plan).
7
Jacob J. Lew, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at Delivering Alpha Conference
Hosted by CNBC and Institutional Investor (July 16, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/jl2570.aspx.
8
See, e.g., SYMANTEC, 2015 INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT VOL. 20 (Apr. 2015),
https://www4.symantec.com/mktginfo/whitepaper/ISTR/21347932_GA-internet-securityt
hreat-report-volume-20-2015-social_v2.pdf (broadly examining the threats faced across
industries).

28

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[July 2016

rise.9 But stealing data is just one motivation for cyber attacks. Consider the
attacks on Sony and the Las Vegas Sands Corporation. Believed to be
attributable to hostile foreign governments,10 these attacks not only
caused substantial financial loss but inflicted permanent damage on the
victims’ computer networks. These attacks are deeply disturbing from a
national security standpoint. We know foreign governments seek the
intellectual property of American companies, but we are not accustomed to
such blatant, malicious, and destructive attacks on our companies for
political reasons.
The severity of cyber attacks may also be exacerbated by our own
delays in detecting incidents. For example, in 2008, Heartland Payment
Systems was breached resulting in the ultimate exposure of the personal
information of 130 million people; yet, no one discovered the intrusion
until 2009.11 In its 2015 M-Trends Report, Mandiant placed the “median
number of days that threat groups were present on a victim’s network
before detection” at 205 days, with the longest presence at 2,982 days.12 We
simply cannot defeat or prevent a threat if we lack the capacity or the will to
know it exists.
B. Why Information Sharing Matters
Against this evolving threat, the costs associated with cyber attacks
are escalating.13 There is also the well-placed concern about the “Brand” of
a victim company. As a result, cybersecurity is becoming a key topic in
9

Global Cybersecurity Threats: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 114th
Cong. (2015) (statement of James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence) (“I believe the
next push of the envelope is going to be the manipulation or the deletion of data which would
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10
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11
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(July 6, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-07-06/lessons-fromthe-data-breach-at-heartlandbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financia
l-advice.
12
M ANDIANT, M-T RENDS 2015: A V IEW F ROM THE F RONT L INES 3 (2015), https://www
2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf.
13
According to a 2015 study released by IBM and the Ponemon Institute, the average cost
per record stolen in a breach in the United States is $217, with a total average cost per
incident of $6.5 million. PONEMON INST., 2015 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL
ANALYSIS (May 2015), http://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?subtype=
WH&infotype=SA&htmlfid=SEW03053WWEN&attachment=SEW03053WWEN.PDF.

Vol. 1:1]

An Initial, But Positive, Step in the Realm of Cybersecurity

29

American boardrooms,14 and has captured the attention of federal and state
regulators and class action lawyers. Many organizations and the government
are searching for solutions, including insurance, compliance programs, data
policies, incident response plans, and improved security. While no silver
bullet will prevent all cyber attacks, one legislative measure took on new
urgency in recent years.
It may seem intuitive that companies should be able to share cyber
threat information with each other, learning about the threats each faces.
Companies not adequately investing in cybersecurity could benefit from
understanding the threats being inflicted upon their competitors, partners, or
affiliates. Companies that are investing in cybersecurity may not only be role
models for others, but as threats change, can more appropriately tailor their
own security investments.
It may also seem natural for private entities to share insight with the
federal government, enabling law enforcement and intelligence agencies
to enhance their understanding of cyber threats by linking this insight
with classified or other sensitive information. This analysis can, in turn, be
shared with the private sector, equipping them to better detect and prevent
malicious activity.15
Yet, until just a few months ago, significant legal restrictions
undermined the ability of private entities to effectively counter new and
challenging threats by sharing cyber threat information. From antitrust laws
that could be interpreted to prevent such private collaboration, to freedom of
information laws that could leave proprietary information shared with the
government vulnerable to disclosure, our laws simply discouraged these simple
exchanges of information. Nor did our laws provide companies with liability
protection from potential lawsuits, a void made more obvious by the years of
litigation faced by telecommunications companies following the disclosure of
the post-9/11 Terrorist Surveillance Program. In spite of these significant risks,
some private entities voluntarily took part over the years in cyber task forces
and various information sharing relationships. However, it eventually became
apparent that such participation was unlikely to increase without legislation
granting clear sharing authorities and better legal safeguards.

14

See NYSE GOVERNANCE SERVICES, A 2015 SURVEY: CYBERSECURITY IN THE
BOARDROOM (2015), https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/VERACODE_Survey_Report.pdf.
15
Joseph Lawler, Fallout Coming from JP Morgan Hack Attack, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 14,
2014), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/fallout-coming-from-jpmorgan-hack-attack/artic
le/2554755 (“We need help and [need to continue] working together with the government . . .
The government knows more than we do.”) (quoting JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon).
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C. Where is the Federal Government?
During the lengthy congressional debate about information sharing
legislation, the federal government, especially the NSA, faced criticism
following the leaks of classified information by Edward Snowden. This
criticism impacted the cyber debate as NSA became a favorite target for
conjecture and unfounded accusations, leading some to oppose any effort
to give them direct access to cyber threat information. It is possible that a
bill that simply addressed private-to-private sharing or significantly
reduced the role of the NSA and other non-civilian agencies might have
been enacted much sooner. But given the vital role that our law
enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies share in countering this
threat-a threat that originates from nation states, terrorists, organized crime,
and lone hackers alike-passing such a limited bill would have been
counterproductive.
Throughout most of this debate, I served both as a Member and the
Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and
as a Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I saw firsthand the
extraordinary cyber assets, capabilities, and knowledge of the U.S.
Government, especially the NSA, which has been blessed with solid
leadership and highly trained professionals. Other Intelligence Community
agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and intelligence elements at the FBI and Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) play key roles in collecting, developing, and analyzing cyber
intelligence. These agencies are very good at what they do. The FBI’s law
enforcement capabilities and interactions with the private sector are vital, as
are the efforts of the Secret Service. Our challenge, then, as policy makers,
was to find a process by which all relevant federal agencies could work
together as seamlessly as possible to protect the nation against the daily
barrage of cyber attacks.
II. PRIOR LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
As the cyber threat increased, the SSCI and other committees of
jurisdiction considered legislative and oversight measures that would
improve the government’s cybersecurity posture and encourage better
coordination and communication among private sector entities and by and
with the federal government. While Congress passed some discrete cyber
provisions, no bill provided the comprehensive liability protections and
flexibility needed to effectively change the status quo. In 2012, however, two
bills garnered the attention of the Senate.
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A. Lieberman/Collins Bill
From the beginning, the Lieberman/Collins bill was problematic. In
spite of the good intentions of its lead sponsors, including Senator Feinstein,
there were just too many drawbacks. The bill included everything from DHS
mandates and the potential for more regulation to more government programs
and an Internet “kill switch.” Amid valid questions about DHS’s capabilities,
there was considerable reluctance to give DHS even more authority. The bill
also would have sidelined the NSA and FBI in the sharing of cyber threat
information. Further, the complexity of the bill’s information sharing
provisions and insufficient liability protections might have discouraged,
rather than encouraged, broader collaboration. In short, many, including
businesses on the front lines of cyber attacks, opposed the bill because it
lacked the necessary options, flexibility, and liability protections. For these
and other reasons, the bill was ultimately defeated in the Senate during the
final months of 2012.
B. Secure It
The competing bill in the Senate, known as SECURE IT, had broad
support from the business community. I was a co-author of this bill,
specifically the information sharing provisions, along with Minority Leader
McConnell, Senator McCain, Senator Burr, and other Ranking Members.
Privacy groups, however, opposed the bill because of its strong liability
protections and authorities for sharing information with government agencies
such as the FBI and NSA. Ultimately, the Majority Leader refused to give the
bill its own floor time for debate.
C. Origins of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
Although no bill was enacted in 2012, it was clear that cybersecurity,
particularly the sharing of threat and intrusion information, was critical to our
national security. Senator Feinstein, as the Chairman of the SSCI, and I, as
the Vice Chairman, resolved to overcome our differences and find a path
forward. Agreeing that neither her information sharing provisions in the
Lieberman/Collins bill nor mine in SECURE IT would gamer enough votes
in the Senate, we committed to finding common ground. The Committee
subsequently held dozens of meetings, hearings, and briefings with
government and private sector representatives and privacy advocates.
In August 2014, the final version of our agreed-upon bill, the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), was voted out of the
SSCI by a 14-3 margin, a remarkable result considering the divided
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atmosphere in the Senate at the time. Unfortunately, the Majority Leader
would not bring the bill to the floor for debate and disposition so the 2014
version of CISA died when Congress adjourned.
III. A POSITIVE STEP : CISA 2015
When the 114th Congress convened in 2015, Senator Burr and
Senator Feinstein as the respective Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
SSCI, revived CISA. The Committee again held meetings, hearings, and
briefings with stakeholders. Senators Burr and Feinstein negotiated with
the White House and other Senators to make bipartisan changes to the
bill. The result: CISA passed the Senate by an overwhelming bipartisan
vote of 74-21; negotiations were held with counterparts in the U.S. House;
and congressional leadership, in particular Majority Leader McConnell,
attached CISA to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 and sent
it to the President for signature in December 2015. Senators Burr and
Feinstein deserve tremendous credit for their leadership in getting this much
needed and long-overdue bill enacted into law.
A. The Purpose of CISA
In order to understand the importance of CISA, it is first necessary to
understand what it is not. CISA is not a surveillance bill. It provides no
additional authority regarding government surveillance or intrusions by
private entities. Rather, it is entirely voluntary, imposing no coercion,
penalty, or other liability if a private entity decides not to share information.
CISA’s core purpose has always been to encourage voluntary sharing of
information while providing vital liability and antitrust protections and
protecting personal information from exposure.
B. Definitions
In my experience, definitions are the heart of national security
legislation. CISA is no exception and its carefully defined key terms include
“appropriate Federal entities;” “cybersecurity purpose;” “cybersecurity
threat;” “cyber threat indicator;” “defensive measure;” and “private entity.”
Some of CISA’s definitions were drawn from SECURE IT, some from
Lieberman-Collins, and others were the product of lengthy negotiations with
privacy and business groups. Other terms, such as “personal information” and
“real-time” were not defined; however, there was consensus to give them
their ordinary meanings. Importantly, CISA intentionally avoided the “nearreal-time” construct of some other bills, emphasizing instead that all of the
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defined federal agencies must be on the same playing field, receiving and
sharing information with each other in real-time, without administrative or
bureaucratic delays.
C. Authorizations
At the center of CISA is the authority for private entities to identify
threats and develop or use protective measures. CISA confirms that private
entities may operate defensive measures on, and monitor, their own
information systems or those of consenting customers or suppliers for
cybersecurity purposes. As described below, private entities may also share
with and receive from private and governmental entities cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures. In developing the authorities and methods
for private sector sharing, CISA carefully considered privacy concerns while
mindful of how threats are detected and analyzed. Private entities that choose
to avail themselves of CISA’s authorities must comply with lawful
restrictions, implement security controls to protect against unauthorized
access, and take steps to remove known personal information not directly
related to a cybersecurity threat.
D. Methods of Sharing
CISA covers the full spectrum of cyber information sharing: it allows
private entities to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with
each other and the Federal government, and facilitates the government’s
sharing of such information with private entities. In short, it establishes a
solid playing field for effectively preventing and mitigating cyber threats.
In response to privacy concerns, CISA does specify the avenues
through which, and the reasons why, the private sector may directly share
information with the federal government: (1) reporting crimes, such as data
breaches; (2) engaging in existing or future information sharing relationships;
(3) conducting meetings, phone conversations, and other non-electronic
format discussions; and (4) engaging in real-time automated sharing through
the DHS portal. Of note, this construct, which was the subject of considerable
debate, creates legal inconsistencies. For example, sharing information by
phone directly with an FBI agent will provide liability protection, but sending
the same information via email to the same agent offers no protection. It
remains to be seen how the courts will view this discrepancy, or whether
Congress will act to improve this construct.
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E. Liability Protection
CISA is not a free pass and does not incentivize unlawful conduct.
Absent full compliance with the clear terms of the Act, there is no liability
protection. CISA does offer incentives to encourage broader sharing,
including antitrust and Freedom of Information Act exemptions, protection
for proprietary information and trade secrets, and regulatory limits.
F. Privacy Measures
CISA was designed to protect privacy interests and includes
numerous privacy protections, such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•

The definition of “cyber threat indicator” limits the information
that can be shared.
Private entities can only monitor their networks, or the networks
of others with specific written consent, for cybersecurity
purposes.
Personal information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat
must be removed before sharing.
All information received by the government must be handled
under established procedures and privacy protections.
Most electronic sharing of cyber threat information with the
Federal government must be through a DHS civilian portal.
The government may only use information it receives for
specified purposes16
G. Congressional Oversight

As with other national security legislation, Congress maintains
current insight into CISA’s implementation. The Executive branch must
submit three separate reports to Congress, including an interagency
inspectors general report and an independent report from the Comptroller
General of the United States on the removal of personal information from
cyber threat indicators.
But these reports are not the beginning and end of congressional
oversight. Congress is reviewing the interim guidelines and procedures
required by CISA, which were submitted to Congress on February 16, 2016.
Also, congressional committees will no doubt hold many hearings and
16

Given the current threat environment, this limitation may need to be re-examined.
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briefings to understand the current threat environment and risks to the private
sector and government, how CISA’s authorities are impacting the nation’s
overall state of preparedness, and whether additional legislative measures are
needed.
IV. MOVING FORWARD
With the enactment of CISA, private entities and the government may
now benefit from mutual exchanges of information, in essence combining
forces to prevent and mitigate cyber attacks. While a good beginning, there
is more to do, here at home and abroad. On the domestic front, Congress must
direct its attention to passing a federal data breach notification bill that clearly
and effectively preempts state law, while resisting the temptation to impose
onerous standards or regulations on American businesses. Currently,
companies must comply with any one or all of 47 different state notification
laws. A single, federal notification framework will allow private entities to
focus their resources and attention on mitigating and preventing incidents,
rather than navigating multiple legal requirements.
Throughout the world, terrorists and nation states are seeking new
ways to use cyber threats to spread fear and destruction. If we are to defeat
these efforts, we must find some consensus among our allies and other
nations on the basics of cybersecurity, such as what constitutes a cyber attack
or an “act of war” in the realm of cyber space. With CISA, America has
shown its leadership and commitment to improving the playing field. Now is
the time for us to extend our leadership and work towards a more secure cyber
world.

